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The California Supreme Court Swings
and Misses in Defining the Scope and
Enforceability of Premarital Agreements
By JOHN G. GHERINI*
AS THE END of August 2000 neared and fall approached, the boys
of summer stretched out their season and rallied momentum to win
baseball's greatest prize-a ticket into the post season. The San Fran-
cisco Giants, outfitted with a new stadium, accepted the challenge and
charged into first place in Major League Baseball's National League
West Division led by their future hall of fame left fielder Barry Bonds.'
But as Bonds geared up for the post season, his attorneys geared up
for a showdown with the California Supreme Court on the enforce-
ability of a premarital agreement he entered into with his ex-wife. Just
as Bonds was making a statement on the field for the Giants, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court made a statement off the field as it issued deci-
sions in In re Marriage of Bonds2 and In re Marriage of Pendleton3 on the
same day. Both decisions dealt with prenuptial agreements4 and
sought to clarify contradictory decisions in the state's courts of appeal.
* Class of 2002. The author wishes to thank his mother, Mary-Ann Gherini, for her
unconditional support and encouragement. This Comment is dedicated to John F.
Gherini, an exceptional father and role model, who has proved to be an invaluable
resource throughout the publication process.
1. See Carl T. Hall, Bonds and The Babe, Giants slugger's season rivals Ruth's prodigious
1920 output, statistical analysis shows. S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 5, 2001, available at http://www.
sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=chronicle/archive/20019/05/MN46610.DTL.
2. 5 P.3d 815 (Cal. 2000).
3. 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000).
4. A prenuptial agreement may be referred to as an antenuptial agreement, ante-
nuptial contract, premarital contract, premarital agreement, or a marital settlement. See
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1200 (7th ed. 1999). A prenuptial agreement is defined as "[an]
agreement made before marriage [usually] to resolve issues of ... property division if the
marriage ends in divorce or by death of the spouse." Id. Hereinafter, antenuptial agree-
ments or premarital agreements will be referred to as prenuptial agreements.
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The use of prenuptial agreements has always been met with vary-
ing degrees of skepticism. Viewed "as the province of the wealthy, the
age disparate, the heartless, or the simply greedy, prenuptial agree-
ments are often regarded with distrust and hostility. '5 Despite such
criticisms, society generally accepts prenuptial agreements as an ap-
propriate device for protecting property in the event of a divorce. 6 In
the last half century, divorce rates rose to a staggering fifty percent.7
Not surprisingly, the use of prenuptial agreements tripled in the pe-
riod from 1978 to 1988, and continues to rise.8
To comply with the changing tide of public opinion regarding
the use of prenuptial agreements, the California legislature took two
definitive steps to sanction their use. First, the legislature passed the
Family Law Act of 1969. 9 This measure allowed no fault divorce and
repealed the previous law requiring a showing of fault or liability by
one spouse against the other to obtain a dissolution."' Second, and
more importantly, the legislature adopted the Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act of 198511 ("UPAA"). The UPAA contains express pro-
visions regulating the use of prenuptial agreements regarding the dis-
tribution of spousal property after a dissolution.1 2
In interpreting the scope of the UPAA, California courts have
struggled to square the new social acceptance of prenuptial agree-
ments with a common law that traditionally favored marriage and dis-
approved of contracts disseminating property upon divorce.' 3
5. Allison Marston, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial Agreements, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 887, 888 (1997).
6. See generally Lenore Weitzman, Legal Regulation of Marriage: Tradition and Change,
62 CAL. L. REV. 1169 (1974) (arguing that traditional state interests in the continuation of
marriages for life have given way to new opinions of the institution that may render such
state concerns obsolete).
7. See Alex Shukhman, Show Her the Money: The California Court of Appeals Mistake
Concerning In re Marriage of Bonds, 20 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 457, 457-58 (2000).
8. See Marston, supra note 5, at 891.
9. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (Deering 1984).
10. CAL. CrV. CODE § 4000 (Deering 1984), repealed by CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West
1994).
11. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1600-1617 (West 1994).
12. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615 (West 1994). But see CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (West
1994) (where the California Senate deleted a portion of the Uniform Act that allowed for
spousal support waivers).
13. See generally Loveren v. Loveren, 39 P. 801 (Cal. 1895) (holding that any contract
that has for its object the dissolution of marriage or the facilitation thereof is void as
against public policy); Hill v. Hill, 142 P.2d 417 (Cal. 1943) (describing the common law as
invalidating any contract that had the direct tendency to promote dissolution). But see In re
Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976) (holding that a contract violates public pol-
icy only insofar as its terms promote dissolution).
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California's Supreme Court has addressed the issue several times and
its decisions have marked the slow evolution of the common law.14
The Bonds and Pendleton decisions are the California Supreme Court's
most recent attempts to clearly define the role of premarital agree-
ments. Since the adoption of the UPAA and prior to these decisions,
critics argued that the court's decisions were ambiguous and failed to
clearly define what was required to create an enforceable prenuptial
agreement.15
This Comment argues that the California Supreme Court's fail-
ure to articulate a usable standard creates a problematic holding that
will lead to continued difficulties in the implementation of UPAA sec-
tions. Part I surveys the origins and evolution of the common law in
the twentieth century, specifically focusing on the changes made by
the California Supreme Court prior to the adoption of the UPAA.
Part II initially focuses on how the California legislature adopted
the UPAA and looks at Bonds and Pendleton to examine the court's
interpretation of the California Uniform Act and modification of the
common law. Specifically, this section takes an in depth look at the
Bonds decision-paying heed to the factual circumstances-to discern
what standard, if any, the court created regarding the enforceability of
premarital agreements. This section also reviews the Pendleton decision
and analyzes how the court used a fact based analysis similar to Bonds,
but applied that reasoning to a determination of whether spousal sup-
port waivers were enforceable.
Part III focuses on the legislative response to Bonds and Pendleton.
This section lays out the changes that the legislature has made to Cali-
fornia law regarding the enforceability of prenuptial agreements, and
argues that although the changes are a good start, there are still sev-
eral issues that present problems for those who seek to create enforce-
able agreements. Ironically, the issues that persist are similar to those
that were created by Bonds and Pendleton.
Finally, Part IV explains that the legislature or the court should
articulate what factors must be followed to create an enforceable
agreement. Leaving discretion with trial courts leaves the bar and the
bench in the dark when trying to determine what issues are pertinent
14. See generally In re Marriage of Higgason, 516 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973) (finding a con-
tract void unless it was made in the contemplation of marriage); In re Marriage of Dawley,
551 P.2d 232 (Cal. 1976) (rejecting dicta in Higgason that agreements are void if they facili-
tate divorce as a misstatement of California law).
15. See Marston, supra note 5, at 913 (recognizing that courts need to more accurately
define what factors lead to enforceable contracts).
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in drafting a prenuptial agreement. Finally, if no changes are made by
the court or legislature, this section sets forth what guidelines should
be followed by practitioners to carry their burden in drafting enforce-
able agreements.
I. Background
The California Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bonds and
Pendleton are best understood in the context of the court's past deci-
sions on the enforceability of premarital agreements under the com-
mon law. The Bonds court began its analysis by explaining that
"[f]rom the inception of its statehood, California has retained the
community property law that predated its admission to the Union"
which contained the general rule that property acquired during the
marriage was community property. 16 The community property doc-
trine that spouses evenly share property acquired during the marriage
served as the starting point for California common law.
The court's decisions in this area have evolved throughout the
twentieth century as the legislature has carved away at the general
common law rule stated above.1 7 The Pendleton court emphasized this
point by relying on common law to determine the enforceability of
spousal support waivers.' 8 In Bonds, the court repeatedly referenced
California common law cases in an effort to qualify its interpretation
of the UPAA. 19
A. Common Law of Marital Contracts at the Turn of the Century
Since the turn of the twentieth century, the state has had a para-
mount interest in the preservation of marriage.2 1 The California Su-
preme Court explained that the "preservation of the marriage
relationship is considered essential to the maintenance of organized
society .... -21 California's legislature addressed this interest by pass-
ing statutes that restricted a married couple's ability to contract with
each other over the distribution of property. Former section 159 of
the California Civil Code provided that "[a] husband and wife cannot,
16. Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 821 (Cal. 2000).
17. See id. ("There is nothing novel about statutory provisions recognizing the ability
of parties to enter into premarital agreements regarding property, because such agree-
ments long were common and enforceable under English law, and have enjoyed a lengthy
history in this country." ).
18. See Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839, 843-47 (Cal. 2000).
19. See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 821-22.
20. See Weitzman, suffra note 6, at 1170.
21. Hill v. Hill, 142 P.2d 417, 417-19 (Cal. 1943).
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by any contract with each other, alter their legal relations.., except
that they can agree to an immediate separation, and may make provi-
sion for the support of either of them and of their children during
such separation." 22 Although the statute allowed separation, it ex-
pressly forbade the parties from entering into a prior contract altering
their legal relationship.
For the first half of the twentieth century, the California Supreme
Court supported public policy goals laid out by the legislature that
discouraged parties from altering their marital rights through con-
tracts, because such contracts encouraged divorce. In Loveren v.
Loveren,23 the California Supreme Court invalidated a marital contract
entered into after separation because it violated public policy.24 Dur-
ing the pendency of the divorce action, the Loverens contracted as to
how their property was to be distributed. 25 Shortly thereafter, Ms.
Loveren became dissatisfied with the agreement and challenged its
validity.26 The court explained that "[t]he authorities are uniform in
holding that any contract between the parties having for its object the
dissolution of the marriage contract, or facilitating that result . . . is
void as contra bonos mores[27 ] . "..."28
California's high court followed this reasoning in Pereira v. Per-
eira29 which involved a contract entered into during the marriage.30
The contract stipulated that the husband would have to pay a set
amount of money if the wife desired a divorce. 31 The court found the
practical effect of the agreement was that the husband "was left free to
inflict upon his wife the most grievous marital wrongs, such as would
compel her to obtain a divorce,"32 and he would be assured that the
agreed sum would compensate the wife for her injuries.33 The court
held the contract void as against public policy because it would en-
courage or facilitate divorce. 34
22. See former CAL. CiV. CODE § 159 (Deering 1960).
23. 39 P. 801 (Cal. 1895).
24. See id. at 802.
25. See id. at 801.
26. See id.
27. Contra bonos mores describes something that is "[o]ffensive to the conscience and
to a sense of justice." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 318 (7th ed. 1999). Such contracts are
regarded as voidable by the courts. See id.
28. Loveren, 39 P. at 802.
29. 103 P. 488 (Cal. 1909).
30. See id. at 489.
31. See id.
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B. Common Law Is Extended to Prenuptial Contracts
Early cases addressing the enforceability of marital contracts pri-
marily involved agreements made after the parties had separated or,
as in Pereira, after the marriage had begun. Courts were not afraid to
strengthen these common law principles and extend them to cases
involving contracts entered into before marriage. 35 One appellate
court noted that any distinction between these circumstances would
be foolish: "[i]f contracts of this nature tend to facilitate the dissolu-
tion of the marriage relation, then they should not be sanctioned by
the courts, irrespective of the time of their execution. '3 6
The California Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning and
made a similar pronouncement in Barham v. Barham,37 in which the
parties executed a prenuptial agreement. The couple subsequently
separated and then remarried. The court found that since the separa-
tion was a completion of the first marriage, the court had to decide
whether the prenuptial agreement from the first marriage applied to
the second marriage. 38 The court noted that "[p] ublic policy seeks to
protect marriage, to encourage parties to live together, and to prevent
separation. 13 9 The court invalidated the contract, regardless of its ap-
plicability to the second marriage, as being against the principle that
"a contract providing 'against liability for a contemplated wrong to be
subsequently inflicted' by one of the spouses upon the other and liqui-
dating 'such liability in advance,' was declared a 'menace to the mar-
riage relation and should not be tolerated .... ,-140 Under Barham, the
California Supreme Court essentially banned any prenuptial agree-
ments because "no-fault divorces" were not permitted. 4'
C. Evolution of the Common Law of Prenuptial Agreements
Substantial societal changes occurred between the California Su-
preme Court's 1944 decision in Barham, and its 1973 decision in In re
Marriage of Higgason-the court's next visit to the realm of prenuptial
35. See Whiting v. Whiting, 216 P. 92, 94 (Cal. 1923); Barham v. Barham, 202 P.2d
289, 296 (Cal. 1923).
36. Whiting, 216 P. at 96.
37. 202 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1949).
38. See id. at 291-94.
39. Id. at 296 (quoting Hill v. Hill, 142 P.2d 417, 422 (Cal. 1943)).
40. Id. at 296 (citing Whiting, 216 P. at 96).
41. If Barham prevented contracts based on future liability, and only divorces based on
liability would be recognized, then no prenuptual agreements would be allowed.
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agreements. 42 During this period, the California legislature adopted
the Family Law Act of 196943 which allowed for no-fault divorces. By
allowing a dissolution to occur without liability falling on any one
party, the legislature undercut the California Supreme Court's ratio-
nale in Barham. Additionally, the legislature enacted laws that gave the
courts power to award spousal support and attorneys' fees in a dissolu-
tion proceeding.44 The new legislative scheme encouraged parties to
contract as to such rights to prevent a court from imposing duties to
pay.45
In re Marriage of Higgason46 presented a factually interesting case.
A wealthy seventy-three year old woman married a forty-eight year old
waiter.47 The couple executed a prenuptial agreement that was subse-
quently challenged by the husband after the couple separated. 4 The
California Supreme Court modified the common law in light of the
legislature's activities. 49 The court decided to uphold prenuptial
agreements, to the extent they related to the disposition of property.50
Conversely, any agreement that altered the support obligations owed
to a spouse would be found invalid.5'
In what has come to be the Higgason decision's most highly criti-
cized statement,52 the court, in enumerating the factors to consider in
upholding a prenuptial agreement, explained that "such an agree-
ment must be made in contemplation that the marriage relation will
continue until the parties are separated by death. '53 The court noted
that "[c]ontracts which facilitate divorce or separation" are void as
against public policy.54 There are several problems with this reason-
ing. First, it required courts to look to the subjective intent of the
parties entering into the agreement to ensure that the parties made
the document in contemplation of the continuation of the mar-
42. See generally Weitzman supra note 6, (noting that people's opinions were changing
about the role of premarital agreements).
43. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West Supp. 2001).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. 516 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973).
47. See id. at 290.
48. See id. at 293.
49. See id.
50. See id. at 295.
51. See id. at 296-97.
52. See In re Marriage of Dawley 551 P.2d 323, 329 (Cal. 1976).
53. See Higgason, 516 P.2d at 295.
54. Id.
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riage. 55 Second, it required courts to determine what was meant by
"facilitate divorce or separation" without any guidelines. 56
Just three years after it handed down the Higgason decision, the
California Supreme Court revisited the area of enforceable prenuptial
agreements. In In re Marriage of Dawley, 7 Betty Johnson was a public
school teacher who became pregnant.58 She feared that she would
lose her job if she had a child born out of wedlock.5 9 Betty convinced
her boyfriend, James Dawley, to marry her.60 James insisted that Betty
enter into a prenuptial agreement to protect his property in the fu-
ture. 61 The agreement secured each party's independent holdings
prior to marriage, as well as their earnings during that time.62 Betty
argued, based on Higgason, that the parties did not make the agree-
ment in contemplation of marriage and therefore it was void. 63 The
court rejected her argument and amended the Higgason decision,
holding that the state's interest in protecting marriage only required
that "the courts refuse to enforce specific contractual provisions which
by their terms seek to promote the dissolution of a marriage."64
The court went to great lengths to clarify Higgason. It observed
that the subjective test of Higgason was certainly ambiguous and failed
to protect any agreement, as the challenging spouse could claim that
he or she entered the contract without contemplating marriage.65 The
court ultimately held that a prenuptial agreement "violates the state
policy favoring marriage only insofar as its terms encourage or pro-
mote dissolution."66 The court expressly rejected the dictum in Hig-
gason regarding the contemplation of marriage requirement.67
The importance of the 1976 Dawley decision is not to be over-
looked. It was the California Supreme Court's last examination of pre-
nuptial agreements before it heard the Bonds and Pendleton cases. In
deciding these cases, the court relied heavily on its reasoning in Daw-
ley. Although the Dawley court was more accepting of prenuptial agree-
55. See Dawley, 551 P.2d at 328.
56. See In re Marriage of Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839, 844 n.5 (Cal. 2000).
57. 551 P.2d 323 (Cal. 1976).
58. See id. at 325.
59. See id. at 326.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 327.
63. See id. at 327-28.
64. Id. at 328.
65. See id. at 329.
66. Id. at 329.
67. See id. at 330.
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ments than early common law holdings, it still left several stones
unturned. Specifically, the court made only general statements about
prenuptial agreements and did not specifically address the waiver of
spousal support. While Dawley limited an enforceability inquiry to the
terms of the agreement, it failed to adequately address what factors
should be considered in determining whether an agreement is
enforceable.
H. Problem: Adoption and Interpretation of the UPAA
After its 1976 decision in In re Marriage of Dawley, the California
Supreme Court did not decide another prenuptial agreement case un-
til after the adoption of the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act.68 In
Bonds, the court pointed out that the UPAA recognized that "there
was some uncertainty and considerable lack of uniformity regarding
the circumstances under which such [prenuptial] agreements would
be enforce [d]" in varying states. 69 The Uniform Act was adopted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws to cre-
ate unambiguous uniform standards to guide states in determining
what factors are relevant in judging the enforceability of prenuptial
agreements. 7 11 California adopted the Uniform Act in 1985 with a few
small but significant changes.71
A. The Act as Adopted in California
The court in Bonds stated that the "California enactment, like the
Uniform Act, sets out the law of premarital agreements, including
such matters as the nature of property subject to such agreements, the
requirement of a writing, and provision for amendments." 72 Most im-
portantly, section 1615 of California's Family Code, like section 6 of
the Uniform Act, governs the enforceability of premarital agreements.
Section 1615 provides that:
(a) A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against
whom enforcement is sought provides either of the following:
(1) That party did not execute the agreement voluntarily.
(2) The agreement was unconscionable when it was executed and,
before execution of the agreement, all of following applied to that
party:
68. See 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
69. In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 822 (Cal. 2000).
70. See UNIF. PREMtArrAL AcREEMENT AcT, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
71. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 1600-1617 (West Supp. 2001).
72. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 822.
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(A) That party was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure
of the property or financial obligations of the other party.
(B) That party did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing,
any right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of
the other party beyond the disclosure provided.
(C) That party did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an
adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations of the
other party. 73
Significantly, the Bonds court found this language was "intended to
[enhance] the enforceability of premarital agreements and to convey
the sense that an agreement voluntarily entered into would be en-
forced without regard to the apparent unfairness of its terms. '74
Some legal practitioners have rightfully noted that the way in
which section 1615(a) was drafted greatly reduces the likelihood that
a court will decide a challenge to a premarital agreement under sec-
tion 1615(a) (2) on the basis that the agreement was unconsciona-
ble. 75 This is due in large part to the fact that "1615(a) is written in
the disjunctive, so that a premarital agreement is unenforceable if ei-
ther of the two enumerated bases for challenging its validity is estab-
lished . . . . 76 Section 1615(a) (2), however, is written in the
conjunctive requiring proof that both the agreement was unconscion-
able and that the party did not have actual knowledge of the other
party's material assets. 77 Thus, a court must enforce an agreement
that may be unconscionable on its face as long as there was full disclo-
sure of party assets. 78 For this reason, most challenges will come under
section 1615(a) (1). This emphasizes the role of the Bonds decision
because of its effect on this section.
The court in Pendleton addressed another difficult section of the
Uniform Act in deciding whether a court may enforce a waiver of
spousal support.79 The court looked to section 1612,80 which specifies
the permissible objects of a premarital agreement. When it was first
introduced in California, section 1612 of the Uniform Act included a
subsection"' that allowed the "modification or elimination of spousal
support."8 2 Before the Act was enacted, the California Senate deleted
73. CAL. FAM. CODE § 1615(a) (West Supp. 2001).
74. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 824.
75. See Dennis Wasser, Prenuptial Disagreements, L.A. LAw. 26 (Dec. 23, 2000).
76. Id. at 28.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See In re Marriage of Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839, 840 (Cal. 2000).
80. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (West Supp. 2001).
81. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612(a) (4).
82. See S. 1143, 1985-1986, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1985).
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this section.83 The court in Pendleton had to determine whether this
deletion evinced legislative intent to render spousal support waivers
unenforceable or whether it reserved that determination for the
courts.
Despite the intent of the original drafters of the Uniform Act to
fashion a law that allowed for more consistent rulings throughout the
states regarding premarital agreements, the Act's presence in Califor-
nia has done little to simplify the process. The California Supreme
Court's rulings in Bonds and Pendleton show that there are still many
issues the court must resolve.
B. The California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Bonds
1. The Trial Court's Findings of Fact
The facts of the Bonds case provide some of the most important
factors for understanding the ramifications of the California Supreme
Court's ultimate decision regarding the enforceability of prenuptial
agreements. The court narrowed its decision to the issue of whether
independent counsel is required to enforce a prenuptial agreement.8 4
In reaching the conclusion that it is not, the court held that the deter-
mination of whether the parties entered into a contract voluntarily is a
question of fact and that determination will be sustained on appeal as
long as it is supported by substantial evidence. 85 Thus, the court failed
to define a clear rule of enforceability and instead used the facts of
Bonds to outline which factors are important to the analysis.
In re Marriage of Bonds details a love affair that transpired over a
very short period of time. The marriage at issue was between Barry
Bonds, a professional baseball player, and Susan Bonds, known as
Sun, who emigrated from Sweden to Canada where she met Barry.8 6
Barry and Sun knew each other for less than three months before
becoming engaged. 87 Wanting to marry before Major League Base-
ball's spring training season began, Barry and Sun decided to wed in
Las Vegas after knowing each other for a year.88 At trial, Barry and
Sun offered conflicting evidence on what occurred just prior to and
during the signing of their prenuptial agreement.89
83. See Amendment to S. 1143, 1985-1986, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1985).
84. See In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 816 (Cal. 2000).
85. See id. at 838.
86. See id. at 816-17.
87. See id. at 817.
88. See id.
89. See id. at 818-19.
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The trial court made the following findings of fact. First, one
week prior to signing the agreement, Barry's lawyer, Leonard Brown,
met with Sun and advised her of her right to obtain her own counsel
and told her that he represented Barry and not her.90 Second, Sun at
no time questioned the signing of the agreement, nor did she ever
express any intent not to sign it.91 Third, Barry fully and properly dis-
closed the nature and approximate value of all his current assets. 92
Fourth, Barry and Sun did not have a confidential relationship prior
to entering into this agreement because there was no evidence that
Sun relied on Barry for financial advice. 93 Finally, and most impor-
tantly, the trial court found that Sun had sufficient knowledge of her
rights to community property during marriage and she understood
that entering into this agreement would adversely affect those rights.
94
In addition, there were some facts on the record that detailed just
how little preparation went into this agreement. The parties signed
the agreement one day before they were to be married in Las Vegas. 95
The agreement was full of typos and immaterial mistakes, apparently
due to time constraints.96 Sun was accompanied at the meeting by a
friend from Sweden who had a limited command of English.97 The
controversial part of the agreement waived any right either spouse
had in the future earnings of the other spouse.98 Subsequent to enter-
ing into the marriage, Barry's income dramatically increased-from
$106,000 a year to well over two million dollars by 1990. 99
Taken together, these facts show an unusual predicament, greatly
complicated by self-imposed time constraints. The unwary reader may
interpret these facts as showing that Sun was taken advantage of by the
time constraints and legal drafting of Bond's attorney. From such a
presumption one could conclude that if these facts show a voluntary
agreement, it is hard to imagine factors that would make an agree-
ment involuntary. But a closer reading of the decision cautions against
such reasoning. There are several warnings given by the court that




94. See id. at 821.
95. See id. at 818.
96. See In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 798 (1999).
97. See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 818.
98. See id. at 818 n.1.
99. See id. at 817.
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one must take into account to ensure that an agreement will be
enforceable.
2. The Court Holds That Lack of Independent Counsel Does Not
Automatically Mean the Agreement Was Entered into
Involuntarily
The court used California's version of the Uniform Act to deter-
mine what factors were necessary to enforce a prenuptial agreement.
Family Code section 1615, described above, requires that the parties
enter into the contract voluntarily.100 The court recognized that
neither the Family Code nor the history of the Uniform Act contained
any information on the meaning of the term "voluntary."'101 However,
several cases from different states, cited in the Uniform Act's history,
used a number of factors to determine voluntariness.10 2 The court
listed the following factors as relevant to this analysis:
[Cloercion that may arise from the proximity of execution of the
agreement to the wedding, or from surprise in the presentation of
the agreement; the presence or absence of independent counsel or
of an opportunity to consult independent counsel; inequality of
bargaining power[;] . .. whether there was full disclosure of assets;
and the parties' understanding of the rights being waived .... 103
The court noted that the lack of independent counsel was only
one factor to be weighed in determining voluntariness, and that it was
not dispositive of coercion.10 4 Most significantly, the court noted that
requiring independent counsel would shift the burden of proof from
the person challenging the agreement to the person defending.10 5
Such a result would directly violate the statute which "expressly places
the burden upon the party challenging the voluntariness of the
agreement."10 6
The court was also persuaded by the comments to the Uniform
Act, in which one commissioner stated, "[n]othing in [the enforce-
ment section] makes the absence of assistance of independent legal
counsel a condition for the unenforceability of a premarital agree-
ment. '"107 The court repeated that the purpose of the Uniform Act
100. See CAL. F A. CODE § 1615 (Deering 1999).
101. See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 823.
102. See id. at 825; see also id. at 824 n.5 (describing the various state court decisions
discussing the meaning of the term "voluntary").
103. Id. at 824-25.
104. See id. at 828.
105 See id. at 829.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 827.
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"was to enhance the enforceability of premarital agreements, a goal
that would not be furthered if agreements were presumed to be of
doubtful voluntariness unless both parties were represented by inde-
pendent counsel." 10 8 The court concluded that, although lack of inde-
pendent counsel was an important factor, the agreement was not per
se unenforceable simply because both parties were not duly repre-
sented. 10 9 By rejecting the appellate court's test-that strict scrutiny
would be used whenever there was not independent counsel-the
Bonds court required an analysis of all the facts to determine whether
the agreement was voluntary. The court highlighted a few of the fac-
tors it felt were relevant but left a great deal of discretion with the trial
courts. 10
3. Relevant Factors in Determining Voluntariness
The California Supreme Court first stated that "[i]n determining
the voluntariness of a premarital agreement, a reviewing court should
accept such factual determinations of the trial court as are supported
by substantial evidence.""I The court then looked to the findings of
the trial court to determine whether the relevant facts were backed by
substantial evidence. 1 2 The California Supreme Court's factual con-
clusions, while confined to the facts of the Bonds case, shed the most
light on what factors a practitioner should consider when drafting pre-
nuptial agreements to ensure their enforceability.
The court found that the "temporal proximity of the wedding to
the signing of the agreement was not coercive,"" 13 despite a statement
that a close proximity of time between the signing of the agreement
and the actual marriage ceremony would be viewed as coercion." 14
There are few situations in which this time period is shorter than it
was in Bonds. There, the agreement was signed just prior to getting on
the plane to Las Vegas where the couple was to be married the next
day.' l 5 The court found that the time period was sufficient because
"the coercive force of the normal desire to avoid social embarrassment
or humiliation was diminished or absent"' 16 as the wedding ceremony
108. Id. at 828.
109. See id. at 829.
110. See id. at 837-38.
111. Id. at 834.
112. See id. at 838.
113. Id. at 834.
114. See id. at 824.
115. See id. at 818.
116. Id. at 835.
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involved a small group of people and would have been easy to
postpone.11 7
Second, the court found that although Sun lacked independent
counsel, she did have a reasonable period of time to obtain coun-
sel. 118 It was well documented that a week prior to entering the agree-
ment, Attorney Brown informed Sun that she was entitled to obtain
her own counsel and Sun declined the invitation. 119 The court also
disagreed with the appellate court's decision that Sun's failure to get
counsel was caused by her inability to pay legal fees, 120 concluding,
"the presentation of the agreement did not come as a surprise to
Sun" 21 and she declined to get counsel because she understood the
agreement.122
Third, the court found that Barry's attorneys told Sun about the
"basics of community property law,. . . that she would be disavowing
the protection of community property law by agreeing that income
and acquisitions during the marriage would be separate property."123
Thus the court concluded that even though Sun was not represented
by counsel, she understood her rights and which of those rights she
was waiving by signing the agreement.1 24
Fourth, the court found the bargaining power of the parties to be
equal-despite the fact that English was not Sun's native language-
based on the trial court's conclusion that she understood the terms of
the agreement.125 The California Supreme Court agreed, holding that
Sun's English skills were sufficient in light of her employment and




120. See id. at 836.
121. Id. at 835.
122. See id.
123. Id. at 835-36.
124. See id. at 833. The suggestion that counsel for one party should inform the other
unrepresented party about community property law may create ethical problems for the
drafting attorney. Judge Ruvolo dissented in the Bonds appellate court case because the
majority there required disclosures to a party that chose to be unrepresented. See In re
Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 822 (1999) (Ruvolo, J., concurring and dissent-
ing). Judge Ruvolo quoted from the comment to Rule 4.3 of the American Bar Association
Model Rules of Professional Conduct which prohibits any advice by a lawyer to an unrepre-
sented party other than informing the party to obtain counsel. See id. (Ruvolo, J., concur-
ring and dissenting).
125. See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 836.
126. See id. at 837 (Sun was a waitress and bartender with aspirations of finishing cos-
metology school).
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cept of keeping property separate "was a relatively simple concept that
did not require great legal sophistication to comprehend and that
was, as the trial court found, understood by Sun."127
Finally, the court "determined that Barry and Sun were not in a
confidential relationship at the time the agreement was executed." 128
The court looked to its language in Dawley, stating that "[p] arties who
are not yet married are not [presumed] to share a confidential rela-
tionship; the record demonstrates that Betty did not rely on the advice
and integrity ofJames in entering into the antenuptial agreement."129
The court found no indication that the legislature overruled Dawley,
leaving it as the current law. 130 Since finding a fiduciary duty shifts the
burden to the person defending the agreement, the court also found
such a holding would violate the express provisions of California's
Uniform Act. 131
4. Ramifications of Bonds on Enforceability
The legislative history of the Uniform Act makes clear that the
commissioners intended to delineate a set of guiding principles
through which state legislatures could develop a consistent body of
law regarding the enforceability of prenuptial agreements. 3 2 Despite
the best efforts of the commissioners and the California legislators,
legal scholars have continued to criticize how courts have addressed
these issues. One scholar reviewed extreme factual situations, similar
to Bonds, where courts upheld the agreement and stated that "[i]n
order to minimize inconsistencies [in court decisions] and promote
procedural fairness, courts need to define the elements that comprise
equitable negotiations .... One way to facilitate this goal is to require
each party entering into a prenuptial agreement to consult with inde-
pendent counsel."'133 Another scholar criticized the court of appeal
decision in Bonds for creating a strict scrutiny standard without au-
thority, but approved of its requirement of independent counsel. "In
light of these problems, the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform Laws should amend the UPAA to require independent
legal counsel for both parties."'1 34
127. Id.
128. Id. at 820.
129. Id. at 832 (quoting In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 331 (Cal. 1976)).
130. See id. at 831.
131. See id. at 832.
132. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT, 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
133. Marston, supra note 5 at 913.
134. Shukhman, supra note 7, at 490.
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The California Supreme Court's decision in Bonds falls short of
alleviating these concerns. Although the court suggested that the
Bonds decision was not intended to spell out the duties that an attor-
ney owes to the other party, the court did say that "it is consistent with
an attorney's duty to further the interest of his or her client [and] for
the attorney to take steps to ensure that the premarital agreement will
be enforceable." 135 In describing what leads to enforceable agree-
ments, the court highlighted the factors listed above. These factors
were not rigidly separate considerations but rather "the presence of
one factor may influence the weight to be given evidence considered
primarily under another factor."1 3 6
In effect, the Bonds decision has created a fluid set of factors
whose importance will be weighed differently in every circumstance,
leaving ample discretion to each reviewing court and failing to define
any concrete principles for attorneys to follow. This result cannot sim-
plify court decisions regarding the enforceability of prenuptial agree-
ments, nor can it promote consistent decisions in lower California
courts. As demonstrated in Bonds, even though there were strong facts
depicting what appeared to be coercion under the court's factors,
there was also room to dismiss those facts. This allows courts to tailor
their decisions independently of any statutory guidelines.
C. The California Supreme Court in In re Marriage of Pendleton
1. The Supreme Court's Reasoning and Holding
In re Marriage of Pendleton 37 involved a dispute over the enforce-
ability and scope of a prenuptial agreement between Candace Pendle-
ton and Barry Fireman.138 Before entering marriage, the parties
agreed to waive all future claims for spousal support.3 9 After the
couple separated, Pendleton challenged the prenuptial agreement,
claiming that the provision waiving spousal support was invalid be-
cause it was against public policy. 140 The California Supreme Court
heard the case to determine whether California's Uniform Act al-
lowed for waivers of spousal support.
135. Bonds, 5 P.3d at 833.
136. Id. at 838.
137. 5 P.3d 839 (Cal. 2000).
138. See id. at 840.
139. See id. The agreement was as follows: "Both parties now and forever waive, in the
event of a dissolution of the marriage, all rights to any type of spousal support or child
support from the other ... " Id.
140. See id.
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The premarital agreement between Pendleton and Fireman ac-
knowledged that independent counsel represented both parties and
both parties had been advised of the meaning and consequences of
the agreement.14' Both Pendleton and Fireman were independently
wealthy. Pendleton had a masters degree and was an aspiring writer
with a monthly net income of $4,233.142 Fireman had a masters and
law degree and was a successful businessman. 143 The trial court found
that spousal support waivers were against public policy and, due to
Pendleton's and Fireman's lavish lifestyle, ordered Fireman to pay
$8,500 a month in spousal support.144 The court of appeal reversed,
finding that spousal support waivers were not per se unenforceable and
the trial court should determine whether this agreement complied
with California's Uniform Act. 145 The California Supreme Court af-
firmed the appellate court's decision.
The California Supreme Court's decision rested heavily on an in-
terpretation of California's Uniform Act. The court noted that as orig-
inally adopted, the act allowed for spousal support. 146 Section 1612 of
California's Family Code describes what can be contracted for in pre-
nuptial agreements. 47 As originally proposed, this section allowed for
the "modification and elimination of spousal support.' 4 The Califor-
nia Senate deleted this section shortly before the legislature adopted
the Uniform Act.1 49
Despite Candace Pendleton's argument that this deletion by the
legislature evinced its intent to forbid waivers of spousal support, the
court found that the permissibility of spousal support waivers depends
on common law interpretations of prenuptial agreements. 150 The
court stated that "we will not presume that the Legislature intended
for the law to remain static. It would be unreasonable to assume that
the Legislature intended the common law of the 19th Century to gov-




144. See id. at 840-41.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 842.
147. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 1612 (Deering 1999).
148. Pendleton, 5 P.3d at 842.
149. See id.
150. See id. at 845.
151. Id. This quote was directed at an earlier reference by the court recognizing that
California's Uniform Act essentially codified the common law on prenuptial agreements at
the time of its adoption. See id.
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fornia Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court that the
common law rule against spousal support waivers was anachronistic
when viewed against current public policy trends.
15 2
The court did not decide, nor did it articulate, what factors make
a spousal support waiver enforceable. The court greatly confined its
holding by refusing to answer "whether circumstances existing at the
time of enforcement of a waiver of spousal support is sought might
make enforcement unjust."1 5 3 Instead the court stated that public pol-
icy was not violated here where a waiver of spousal support was en-
forced between "intelligent, well-educated persons, each of whom
appears to be self-sufficient in property and earning ability, and both
of whom have advice of counsel .... ,154 This suggests that even
though a spousal support waiver is not per se unenforceable, there are
factual circumstances that may make enforceability unjust. The court
does not describe or suggest what these factors might be outside the
facts of this case.
2. The Effect of Pendleton on Enforceability
After Pendleton, it appears there are two additional factors to con-
sider when attempting to draft an enforceable prenuptial agreement
that seeks to waive spousal support. First, a drafting attorney must con-
sult the common law at the time parties enter into the agreement to
ensure that the tide of support for enforceability has not turned since
Dawley and Pendleton. Second, factual determinations need to be made
concerning the fairness of the agreement even though it is not clear
which factors are pertinent enough to render enforcement unjust.
The same evils that plague the Bonds decision are evident in Pen-
dleton as the court has decided to leave determination of enforceability
to trial courts with little or no guidance. While the Bonds decision was
unanimous, Justice Kennard dissented in Pendleton and highlighted
her concerns about the court's reasoning. Justice Kennard stated that
the majority's decision "abdicates [the court's] responsibility to articu-
late guidelines for the bench and bar explaining when, if ever, such
waivers are enforceable."15 5 She concluded by emphasizing that " [t] he
majority's silence on these important questions does a disservice to
the public, the bar, and the bench.' 56Justice Kennard took issue with
152. See id.
153. Id. at 848.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 852 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
156. Id. at 853 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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the fact that the majority failed to articulate a useable standard. 157
This flaw not only contaminates the Pendleton decision, but infects the
Bonds court's reasoning as well.
III. The Legislature's Response to Bonds and Pendleton
After the Bonds and Pendleton decisions were published, the Cali-
fornia legislature was quick to clarify the issues addressed by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.15 8 Within five months of the decisions, Senator
Sheila Kuehl introduced an amendment to California's Family Code
regarding the enforceability of prenuptial agreements.1 59 The legisla-
tive history of Senate Bill 78 ("S.B. 78") suggests that Senator Kuehl
was predominately concerned with the errors the court made in the
Pendleton case. She stated that "the court fundamentally misinter-
preted the Legislature's intent" regarding the appropriateness of
spousal support waivers. 160 Regarding Bonds, the legislative history in-
dicated that "this measure addresses the Bonds decision head on by
clarifying in two ways the circumstances which must be present for a
court to find that a particular pre-marital agreement was executed
voluntarily."161
A. Amendments to California's Family Code
Senate Bill 78 met little opposition in the legislature as it passed
with almost unanimous support. 162 It was sent to the governor on Au-
gust 31, 2001.16 The governor signed the bill into law on September
12, 2001.164 The changes made by the bill, and the support the bill
received demonstrated that the California Supreme Court's reasoning
in Bonds and Pendleton was not well received.
157. See id. at 852 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
158. See S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Senate Third Reading, at 3 (Cal. 2001).
159. See S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Complete Bill History, at I (Cal. 2001).
160. See S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Senate Floor/Unfinished Business, at 4 (Cal.
2001).
161. Premarital Agreements: Hearing on S.B. 78 Before Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, S.B. 78,
2001-2002 Sess., at 9-10 (Cal. 2001) (noting that the two circumstances are: first, that
there is a reasonable disclosure of all financial assets; and second, that pre-conditions be
met to ensure a voluntary agreement was executed).
162. The bill was passed in the Assembly with 61 Ayes and only 6 Noes. It was passed in
the Senate with 39 Ayes and 0 Noes. See S. 78, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess., Complete Bill History,
at 1 (Ca. 2001).
163. SeeS. 78, 2001-2002 Reg. Sess., Complete Bill History, at I (Cal. 2001).
164. Jennifer Warren, Protections Added to Prenuptual Pacts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at
B1.
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The bill amends section 1612 of the Family Code which describes
the permissible contents of prenuptial agreements. Subsection (c) was
added to specifically clarify the issues raised in Pendleton. Before the
bill was passed, section 1612 did not mention spousal support, now
that section states that:
[a]ny provision in a premarital agreement regarding spousal sup-
port, including, but not limited to, a waiver of it, is not enforceable
if the party against whom enforcement of the spousal support pro-
vision is sought was not represented by independent counsel at the
time the agreement containing the provision was signed .... An
otherwise unenforceable provision in a premarital agreement re-
garding spousal support may not become enforceable solely be-
cause the party against whom enforcement is sought was
represented by independent counsel.' 65
Although this amendment does not affect the narrow holding in
Pendleton-that spousal support waivers are not per se void as against
public policy-it adds significant protections to a party who benefits
from spousal support and also calls into question the viability of the
Bonds holding that independent counsel was not dispositive in deter-
mining enforceability. It is clear from the language of the bill that if
spousal support is waived, independent counsel is required. 1 66 The
bill also directly attacks the California Supreme Court's decisions by
amending section 1615 of the Family Code pertaining to the enforce-
ability of prenuptial agreements. Unlike section 1612, section 1615
lists the requirements of an enforceable agreement. Subsection (c)
was added to directly alter the Bonds court's failure to clarify which
factors would lead to an enforceable prenuptial agreement. Subsec-
tion (c) states:
[I] t shall be deemed that a premarital agreement was not executed
voluntarily unless the court finds in writing or on the record all of
the following: (1) The party against whom enforcement was sought
was represented by independent legal counsel at the time of sign-
ing the agreement or after being advised to seek independent legal
counsel, expressly waived, in a separate writing, representation by
independent legal counsel. (2) The party against whom enforce-
ment is sought had not less than seven calendar days between the
time that party was first presented with the agreement ... and the
time the agreement was signed. (3) The party against whom en-
forcement is sought, if unrepresented by legal counsel, was fully
165. S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Enrolled Bill Text (Cal. 2001).
166. It is interesting to note that in earlier drafts of the bill, Senator Kuehl wanted to
directly attack the Pendleton decision. The legislative history states that "[t]he author in-
tends with this bill to legislatively confirm that waivers of spousal support in premarital
agreements are void as against public policy." S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Senate Floor/
Unfinished Business., at 4 (Cal. 2001).
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informed of the terms and basic effect of the agreement as well as
the rights and obligations he or she was giving up by signing the
agreement, and was proficient in the language in which the expla-
nation of the party's rights was conducted and in which the agree-
ment was written. The explanation of the rights and obligations
relinquished shall be memorialized in writing and delivered to the
party prior to signing the agreement. The unrepresented party
shall, on or before the signing of the premarital agreement, exe-
cute a document declaring that he or she received the information
required by this paragraph and indicating who provided that infor-
mation. (4) The agreement and the writings executed pursuant to
paragraphs (1) and (3) were not executed under duress, fraud, or
undue influence, and the parties did not lack capacity to enter into
the agreement. (5) Any other factors the court deems relevant. 167
The failure of the Bonds decision to articulate a workable stan-
dard is most evident in light of the changes made to section 1615.
Despite the court's assurance that the legislature did not intend to
give more weight to the presence of independent counsel, 168 Senator
Kuehl and the legislature have suggested otherwise in S.B. 78.169 In so
doing, the legislature has provided factors that can be used by practi-
tioners and courts in determining whether a prenuptial agreement is
enforceable.
B. Remaining Concerns
Justice Kennard, in her Pendleton dissent, argued that the court
had erred by failing to articulate a clear standard regarding the en-
forceability of prenuptial agreements. 170 S.B. 78, seemingly in re-
sponse to Justice Kennard's concerns, "seeks to clarify the
circumstances when courts may enforce pre-marital agreements. '1 7 1
While the legislature's efforts are a good first step, several issues re-
main that may create potential problems for practitioners seeking to
draft enforceable agreements.
First, section 1615 (c) (3) requires that an unrepresented person is
fully informed of the terms of the agreement and the basic affect the
agreement will have on his or her rights.' 72 However, this section does
not require that an unrepresented party actually understand the effect
of the agreement that they are signing. This raises the question of
167. S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Enrolled Bill Text (Cal. 2001).
168. See In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 828 (Cal. 2000).
169. See S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Enrolled Bill Text, at § 1615(c)(1) (Cal. 2001).
170. See Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839, 852-53 (Cal. 2000) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
171. Premarital Agreements: Hearing on S. 78 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary, S. 78,
2001-2002, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001).
172. See S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Enrolled Bill Text, at 1615(c) (3) (Cal. 2001).
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what a practitioner must do to carry his or her burden of disclosure to
the unrepresented party. Will a blanket statement about community
property law suffice, 173 or does the attorney need to ensure that the
unrepresented party actually understands the issues? The latter would
require a full disclosure of the effects of the agreement. Critics of S.B.
78 have expressed concern that this disclosure will "likely mean that
any oversight (in providing full disclosure), no matter how slight,
might be grounds for a set aside .... ,,174
Second, requiring an attorney to make disclosures to an unrepre-
sented party raises the possibility of dual representation. 75 Appellate
courts have found that such violations of the Professional Rules of
Conduct could result in disqualification, 176 damages against the attor-
ney, 1 77 or possibly the voiding of the agreement. 1 78 Rule 3-310(C) (1)
prohibits representation of more than one client in which the client's
interests conflict.179 S.B. 78 creates a situation in which an attorney
may be undertaking the defense of more than one party with adverse
interests through the disclosures that the bill requires. The bill makes
no mention of this problem.
Third, in addition to creating potential conflicts of dual represen-
tation, requiring an attorney to give advice to unrepresented parties
may violate other ethical rules of conduct. Judge Ruvolo dissented in
the Bonds appellate decision and cautioned that the comment to Rule
173. See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 836 (finding that the agreement was voluntary, in part, be-
cause basic community law principles had been explained to Mrs. Bonds prior to the sign-
ing to the agreement).
174. Premarital Agreements: Hearing on S. 78 Before the Assembly Comm. onJudiciay, S.B. 78,
2001-2002 Sess. at 10-11 (Cal. 2001) (statement in opposition by The Family Law Section
of the Los Angeles County Bar Association).
175. This was also a problem in the suggestions made by the court in Bonds-it sug-
gested that the basic tenets of community property law should be disclosed to an unrepre-
sented party. See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 835-36. See also Cal. R. Ct. Code Ann. R.P.C. 3-310,
Discussion § 7 (West 2001) (explaining that dual representation in the preparation of anti-
nuptial agreements was an example of a situation in which Rule 3-310(C)(1)-(2) would
apply).
176. See Woods v. Superior Court, 197 Cal. Rptr. 185, 189 (1983) (finding that a viola-
tion of professional rules of conduct that prohibit representing conflicting interests results
in disqualification of the attorney).
177. See Klemm v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. Rptr. 2d 509, 514 (1977) (warning that
failing to disclose a potential conflict between clients of an attorney could result in civil
liability against the attorney).
178. See id. at 509 (stating that the validity of an agreement without independent coun-
sel is vulnerable to easy attack). See also In re Marriage of Egedi, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 523
(2001) (finding that when an attorney is acting only as the scrivner to an agreement he
need not inform the parties of the pros and cons of his alleged dual representation).
179. See Cal. R. Ct. Code Ann. R.P.C. 3-310(C)(1) (West 2001).
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4.3 of the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct prohibited an attorney from giving any advice to an unrepre-
sented party.I"" Judge Ruvolo recognized that California's Rules of
Professional Conduct had not yet adopted a similar provision. '8 ' How-
ever, "in the absence of a rule of professional responsibility conflicting
with or dealing with the same subject matter, California courts may
look to the ABA Model Code for guidance or support for conduct." 182
There is a colorable argument that S.B. 78 encourages ethical viola-
tions because it requires a drafting attorney to make certain disclo-
sures to unrepresented parties. 8 3
Finally, even though the legislature has provided some guidelines
for determining whether an agreement is enforceable, it has failed to
eliminate the ambiguity that flows from leaving unbounded discretion
with the courts. 184 Section 1615(c) (5) gives courts discretion to weigh
any other factors that they deem relevant, in effect creating a "catch
all" provision. 85 Such a blanket provision allows courts to fall back on
the same case-by-case analysis which Justice Kennard objected to in
Pendleton.18 6 Additionally, there are no guidelines for how subsection
(5) will be weighed compared to the other subsections. It is possible,
under the current language, for an agreement to be struck down even
though subsections (1) through (4) are complied with because a
court finds "other" factors to be particularly relevant.
For example, if an unrepresented party's natural language was
not English, as in the Bonds case, or if the unrepresented party had a
history of emotional instability, a court could utilize subsection (5).
Presumably, a court could make an enforceability determination
180. See In re Marriage of Bonds, 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783, 822 (Cal. 1999) (Ruvolo, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
181. See id.
182. Id. at 822 n.11. See also Santa Clara County Counsel Att'ys Ass'n. v. Woodside, 28
Cal. Rptr. 2d 617 n.7 (Cal. 1994).
183. Senator Kuehl has been quoted as saying that S.B. 78, as adopted by the California
legislature, "protects the spouses who are called upon, just before a wedding, to waive all
their future rights .... It still allows them to do that, but I think these protections give
them a better chance to know what they're waiving." Jennifer Warren, Protections Added to
Prenuptial Pacts, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2001, at B1.
184. Without a clear set of guidelines, it is impossible to predict how varying lower
courts will handle enforceability issues. Justice Kennard dissented in Pendleton and chas-
tised the court for failing to articulate a standard that the bench and bar could follow. See
Pendleton, 5 P.3d 839, 852-53 (Cal. 2000) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
185. See S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., Enrolled Bill Text (Cal. 2001). See also Premarital
Agreements: Hearing on S. 78 Before the Assem. Comm. on Judiciary, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., at 11
(Cal. 2001) (stating that subsection (5) was a "catch all" section).
186. See Pendleton, 5 P.3d at 852-53 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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based on an unrepresented party's intelligence, or lack thereof. While
this may seem equitable in some cases, there is absolutely no way for a
drafting attorney to take every factual nuance into account in an effort
to create an enforceable agreement.1 87 Without specific guidelines,
there is no limit to the factors a court might find compelling. Opposi-
tion to the bill highlighted this concern by stating that the "catch-all"
factor "will alone leave every premarital agreement vulnerable to be-
ing set aside."' 8 Enforceability decisions must be grounded in a more
structured set of rules than the whims of trial judges across the state.
IV. Solution
The California Supreme Court, through its Bonds and Pendleton
decisions, addressed several issues regarding the enforcement of pre-
nuptial agreements. The problem is that the court detailed a myriad
of factors that should be considered without clearly defining how, and
in what situations, each factor will be weighted. The legislature quickly
responded and attempted to clarify the issues raised by Bonds and Pen-
dlton. A close reading of the new legislation reveals that many of the
concerns created by the court's rulings have yet to be resolved. Issues
of dual representation and unbounded discretion in the courts con-
tinue to create ambiguity for practitioners seeking to create enforcea-
ble agreements.
A. Continued Legislative or Judicial Reform
There can be little doubt in light of the recent efforts by the legis-
lature that deficiencies exist regarding issues of enforceability of pre-
nuptial agreements. The steps taken by the legislature to this point are
effective and have improved the state of the law from its position im-
mediately after Bonds and Pendleton. However, other issues remain un-
resolved. The legislature and the California Supreme Court are in the
best position to effectuate change.189 The changes should mirror the
187. "One family law attorney said the law lacks specificity, and predicted it would lead
to more litigation." Jennifer Warren, Protections Added to Prenuptial Pacts, L.A. TIMES, Sept.
13, 2001, at BI.
188. Premarital Agreements: Hearing on S. 78 Before the Assembly Comm. on Judiciary,
2001-2002, Reg. Sess., at 11 (Cal. 2001) (statement of opposition by The Family Law Sec-
tion of the Los Angeles County Bar Association).
189. See generally Charlotte K. Goldberg, If It Ain't Broke Don't Fix It: Premarital Agreements
and Spousal Support Waivers in California, 33 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1245, 1247 (2000) (arguing
that only the California legislature can effectively set the proper policy criteria for deter-
mining the enforceability of premarital agreements).
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goals of S.B. 78190 with special attention given to the problems high-
lighted herein.
Initially, the ambiguity of the amendment to section 1615 could
be clarified by legislative amendment. Section 1615(c) (3) should be
amended to describe exactly how much disclosure is required to duti-
fully apprise an unrepresented party of his or her rights and how
those rights are affected by the agreement. Clarity on this issue would
allow an attorney to efficiently ensure that the unrepresented party
was duly informed, eliminating future lawsuits challenging the efficacy
of the disclosure.
The legislature must also create a standard document that could
be given to an unrepresented party advising them of their community
property rights and explaining that such rights would be affected by
signing the agreement. 191 This would resolve ambiguities in the stat-
ute and remove the burden of disclosure from the attorney, insulating
him or her from claims of dual representation or other ethical
violations.
In addition to resolving ambiguities in the language of the stat-
ute, the legislature should amend section 1615(c) (5) to prevent lower
courts from making enforceability decisions without an articulable
standard. The legislative history is devoid of information on the pur-
pose or necessity of this subsection. Subsection (c) (5) does more
harm than good by preventing section 1615 from detailing a clear
standard for enforceability. The legislature should simply delete sub-
section (5). Alternatively, the legislature could define some of the ar-
eas in which subsection (5) factors arise, thus providing some
guidance for lower courts and practitioners. For example, the legisla-
ture could suggest that other relevant factors may relate to the intelli-
gence or emotional stability of the parties. Although the latter option
does not completely solve the problem, it gives drafting practitioners
more guidance to ensure that the agreement was voluntarily signed.
The California Supreme Court has examined the area of marital
dissolution law several times over its history. It has even demonstrated
a willingness to correct mistakes made in earlier decisions. Only three
years after its decision in In re Marriage of Higgason, the court granted
190. See S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg. Sess., S. Floor Report, at 1 (Cal. 2001).
191. In an effort to inform individuals who do not have legal counsel of the responsibil-
ities of using a durable power of attorney, the California legislature drafted a notice to be
given to such individuals informing them of applicable laws and duties. See generally CAL.
PROB. CODE § 4128 (Lexis Supp. 2001). A similar type of notice could be used to inform
unrepresented parties of their community property rights and how those rights could be
affected by a prenuptial agreement.
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review in the Dawley case to clarify some of the ambiguities it had cre-
ated. 92 The current state of the law presents another opportunity for
the court to more clearly articulate a workable standard.
The court, in conjunction with the California State Bar, could
immediately address the problems of dual representation that are
raised by the new legislation. Rule of Professional Conduct 1-100
states that the rules "have been adopted by the Board of Governors of
the California State Bar and approved by the California Supreme
Court pursuant to Business and Professions Code sections 6076 and
6077 to protect the public and promote respect and confidence in the
legal profession."' 93 The Board of Governors could submit an initia-
tive to change Rule of Professional Conduct 3-310 to allow disclosures
by attorneys to unrepresented parties without a threat of creating dual
representation.194 This would prevent an attorney from representing
adverse interests and would give attorneys flexibility in ensuring that
unrepresented parties not only know their rights, but understand
them as well.
B. Practitioner's Guide to Enforceable Prenuptial Agreements
If the legislature and the court fail to clarify the issues raised in
this area of law, then practitioners are left to their own devices to de-
termine the most effective way to ensure an enforceable prenuptial
agreement. The best way to accomplish this feat is to pay specific heed
to both the factors laid out by Bonds and Pendleton, as well as the fac-
tors highlighted by the legislative amendments. Clearly, obtaining in-
dependent counsel is the single most important step to ensuring
enforceability. 195 The Continuing Education Bar, Estate Planning and
California Probate Reporter briefed the Bonds and Pendleton decisions
and agreed that "it will be easier to obtain enforcement of a premari-
tal agreement if both parties are represented by independent coun-
192. See In re Marriage of Dawley, 551 P.2d 323, 328 (Cal. 1976).
193. Cal. R. Ct. Code. Ann. R.P.C. 1-100 (West 2001); see also CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6076 (West 2001) (stating that "[w]ith the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board of
Governors may formulate and enforce rules of professional conduct for all members of the
bar in the State").
194. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076.5 (West 2001) (describing the formal proce-
dures that the State Bar must take to formulate an initiative that would change the Rules of
Professional Conduct).
195. See In re Marriage of Bonds, 5 P.3d 815, 829 (Cal. 2000); S. 78, 2001-2002, Reg.
Sess., Enrolled Bill Text § 1615(c)(1) (Cal. 2001).
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sel."'196 However, further actions must be taken to ensure that an
agreement cannot be successfully challenged.
First, enforceability determinations will depend on a factual anal-
ysis. Therefore it is necessary that an attorney develop a sound factual
record. This can be accomplished by videotaping signing conferences
and other meetings between the parties, or hiring a court reporter to
document the events to show that the agreement was entered into
voluntarily. Also, in keeping with section 1615(c) (3) requirements, an
attorney must memorialize conversations with unrepresented parties
so that a factual record is established.
Second, if one party decides that independent counsel is not
needed, the burden is on the attorney for the represented party to
ensure that a conflict of interest does not arise. Section 1615(c) (3)
requires some form of disclosure to the unrepresented party. The
scope of this disclosure is unclear in the current language of the stat-
ute and the Bonds decision. 97 It is possible that any legal advice could
create a dual representation situation that would carry adverse effects
for the represented party.'98 Therefore, the attorney should inform
the unrepresented party that he has a duty of loyalty to his client and
his client alone and that he does not represent any other parties to
the agreement. 199 The attorney should obtain an "informed written
consent"20 0 from both parties which requires disclosing the adverse
consequences of such representation if a court were to determine that
dual representation occurred. 20 1 This consent will prevent an attorney
from being liable to either client for representing clients with conflict-
ing interests. 2112
Conclusion
Both the commissioners who drafted the Uniform Act and the
California legislators who put it into effect recognized confusion in
the common law regarding premarital agreements. The Uniform Act
196. CEB, 22 EST. PLAN. & CAL. PROB. REP. 61, 63 (Oct. 2000).
197. See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 835-36 (finding that describing basic community property
principles was sufficient to make the unrepresented party aware of her rights).
198. See Cal. R. Ct. Code Ann. R.P.C. 3-310, Discussion (West 2001) (stating that dual
representation occurs in the drafting of antenuptial agreements).
199. See Bonds, 5 P.3d at 833.
200.1 See Cal. R. Ct. Code Ann. R.P.C. 3-310(A)(2) (West 2001) (defining "informed
written consent"). See also Cal. R. Ct. Code Ann. R.P.C. 3-310(C)(1) (West 2001) (stating
that such consent is required if adverse interests are represented by the same attorney).




and state laws clarified a number of issues regarding the legal effect of
these documents. However, in certain areas such as the enforceability
of prenuptial agreements, the courts have struggled to define clear
principles that can be used to ensure this enforceability. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court's efforts in this area, manifested through the
Bonds and Pendleton decisions, attempt to square a century of common
law principles with those described in the Uniform Act. Unfortu-
nately, a continued reliance on the common law combined with a new
fact-based analysis has proved to be problematic. The legislature has
attempted to cure some of the ambiguities created by the California
Supreme Court's decisions. While the attempt was valiant, the same
deficiencies that plagued Bonds and Pendleton seeped into the legisla-
tive amendments.
Who will step up to the plate next? The legislature or the court
can remedy any lingering issues in this area by limiting the discretion
given to lower courts and outlining factors that practitioners can rely
on to draft enforceable agreements. Outside of these adjustments,
practitioners are left with but one weapon: diligence. By being mind-
ful of dual representation traps, obtaining proper consent from the
parties, and following the legislature's guidelines, many concerns can
be alleviated. Until reliable factors are clearly articulated, practition-
ers and courts will have to guess what is important in determining the
enforceability of premarital agreements. The practitioner who exer-
cises the most care utilizing these suggestions will likely be best pre-
pared to defend his or her agreements.
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